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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is a 42 U.S.C §1983 case involving claims for false arrest and excessive force.

B.

Course of Proceedings
This case arises from an appeal from Summary Judgment from the Fourth Judicial

District, which ruled that Mr. Picatti's claims for false arrest were barred by the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. The Court found that all of the elements of collateral estoppel had been
satisfied as the court in the underlying criminal matter ruled that probable cause to arrest Mr.
Picatti existed.
Additionally, the District Court found that since Mr. Picatti could not relitigate probable
cause to arrest him for felony aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer, the detennination
of whether excessive force was used must be based upon the facts as established in the probable
cause finding. With those facts, the District Court applied the second prong of the qualified
immunity analysis and found that Mr. Picatti did not have a clearly established right to be free
from forcible removal from his vehicle after he had given Deputy Miner probable cause to
believe he had committed an aggravated battery upon Deputy Miner, and after he had failed to
voluntarily exit his vehicle as lawfully ordered by Deputy Miner. Furthermore, Mr. Picatti did
not have a clearly established right to be free from Deputy Miner's deployment of his Taser
when-after he had given Deputy Miner probable cause to believe he had committed an
aggravated battery upon Deputy Miner, and after he had failed to voluntarily exit his vehicle as
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lawfully ordered by Deputy Miner-he engaged in a physical struggle with Deputy Miner and
other officers upon being forcibly removed from his vehicle.

C.

Statement of Facts
On July 12, 2014, the Eagle Fun Days celebration, including a parade, was taldng place

in Eagle, Idaho. R Vol. I, p.000520. In order to maintain a safe environment and assist with
traffic, extra law enforcement was in place. R Vol. I, p.000199, P. 22, L. 23-P. 23, L.9. Deputy
Miner and Deputy Laurance were stationed at the .corner of Highway 44 and Eagle Road to assist
with traffic control and maintain a safe environment. Id.
Shortly before the parade was to begin, northbound Eagle Road was closed off to all
vehicle traffic. R Vol. I, p.000262, P.15, L. 5-10. There were traffic control devices in place
that blocked off traffic from travelling northbound on Eagle past the intersection with Highway
44. Id. at R Vol. I, p.000262, P. 16, L. 12- P.17, L. 13. The right turn lane from westbound
Highway 44 to northbound Eagle Road was blocked off by large orange traffic barrels. Id. at P.
17, L.12-13.

At about that same time, Mr. Picatti was driving to his home in Eagle.

R Vol. I,

p.000303, P. 67, L. 24-25. He attempted two different routes which were both blocked off to
traffic before he approached the intersection of Highway 44 and Eagle Road. Id at. P. 68, L. 18P. 69, L. 12. As Mr. Picatti approached the intersection of Highway 44 and Eagle, he travelled
off the roadway to go around the large orange traffic barrels that were in place to close off all
northbound vehicle traffic on Eagle Road. Id. at R Vol. I, p.000304, P. 69, L. 24-P.70, L. 6.
This required that Mr. Picatti not only cross over the fog-line and onto the shoulder, but rather,
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required that he travel off of the pavement and into the dirt. Id. at R Vol. I, p.000306-000307, P.
81, L. 11-P. 82, L.15.
Deputy Miner and Deputy Laurance' s attention was drawn to Mr. Picatti when he drove
off the roadway and around the traffic barrels as it appeared as though Mr. Picatti was not
slowing down and was not going to stop. R Vol. I, p.000207, P. 54, L. 6-24; R Vol. I, p.000263000264, P. 17, L. 18-L. 25, P. 20, L. 12-16. Deputy Laurance began to unholster his gun as he
did not believe Mr. Picatti was going to stop. R Vol. I, p.000264, P. 21, L. 3-7.

Mr. Picatti proceeded up to the cross-walk on northbound Eagle Road with the intent of
driving through and onto northbound Eagle Road. R Vol. I, p.000309, P. 91, L. 20-24. Before

Mr. Picatti was able to get all the way through the cross-walk, Deputy Miner pushed his way
through the crowd of pedestrians to try to stop Mr. Picatti. R Vol. I, p.000310, P. 96, L.10-13; R
Vol. I, p.000207, P. 54, L. 22-P.55, L.24. However, Mr. Picatti did not stop and hit Deputy
Miner, pushing him back into the cross-walk. R Vol. I, p.000208-000209, P. 57, L. 12-P. 60,

L. 6. Deputy Laurance saw Mr. Picatti hit Deputy Miner. R Vol. I, p.000264, P. 21, L. 7-10.
Deputy Miner slammed his hand on the top of the hood of Mr. Picatti's truck in an
attempt to get his attention. Id. at P. 58, L. 2-10. However, Mr. Picatti's truck moved forward
and hit Deputy Miner a second time. Id The second push was a little harder than the first and it
was Deputy Miner's perception that Mr. Picatti was attempting to push through him. R Vol. I,
p.000209, P. 60, L. 1-L. 6. Mr. Picatti does not deny hitting Deputy Miner with his truck:
4

s
6

Q. Okay. And did the front of your truck hit
that officer?
A. If you have to define "hit."
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7

Q. Was there an impact?

8

A. Did he touch the front of my truck, I

don't -- the only thing I know he touched was he
slammed his hand on the hood.
11 Q. Okay. So did the front of your truck -12
like the grill, the bumper, that's what 1 mean by the
13
front of your truck -- did it hit that officer?
14 A. I couldn't tell you if it hit or not.
9

10

R Vol. I, p.000310, P. 97, L.4-14.
Deputy Miner then walked around to the driver's side of Mr. Picatti's truck, opened his
door, and ordered Mr. Picatti to get out of his truck. R Vol. I, p.000209, P. 60, L. 10-P.62, L. 18.
Mr. Picatti refused Deputy Miner's commands and refused to get out of the truck. Id.; R Vol. I,
p.000312, P. 104, L. 13-105-, L.12. Mr. Picatti admits that Deputy Miner ordered him out of the
truck but he refused to obey the order. R Vol. I, p. 000522. Deputy Miner was forced to reach
into Mr. Picatti's truck to release his seatbelt and remove him from his truck.

R Vol. I,

p.000209, P. 62, L. 19-P.63, L. 14; R Vol. I, p.000210, P. 67, L. 15-16. Deputy Laurance came
to assist at this time. R Vol. I, p.000211, P. 68, L. 5-10.

Mr. Picatti immediately began to struggle with Deputy Miner and Deputy Laurance. R
Vol. I, p.000210-00211, P. 67, L. 24-P.68, L. 22. Mr. Picatti refused to put his hands behind his
back and refused to comply with the deputies' commands. Id. They were not able to get control
of his arms and could not get him handcuffed. Id. In the course of the struggle, Mr. Picatti and
the deputies went to the ground. R Vol. I, p.000212-000213, P. 72, L. 15-P. 76, L. 3. Officer
Goodspeed also arrived to assist in trying to subdue and arrest Mr. Picatti. Id.
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Despite the fact that there were two deputies and one officer attempting to subdue and
arrest Mr. Picatti, he continued to refuse to obey their commands and put his hands behind his
back. Id. Plaintiff admits that he refused to put his hands behind his back and instead, continued
to pull his hands away and place them on the ground in front of him in an attempt to get up. R
Vol. I, p. 000522; R Vol. I, p.000314, P. 113, L. 8-11; R Vol. I, p.000315, P. 116, L. 9-15; R
Vol. I, p.000316, P. 118, L. 19-22.
At one point during the struggle, Deputy Laurance felt his gun being tugged on. R Vol. I,
p.000264, P. 21, L. 17-21. He yelled, "get your hands off my gun." Id. Upon hearing that,
Deputy Miner feared that Mr. Picatti was getting control of Deputy Laurance's weapon. R Vol.
I, p.000212, P. 73, L. 3-21. Deputy Miner tased Mr. Picatti one time by placing the Taser to

Mr. Picatti's back. R Vol. I, p.000213, P. 79, L. 3-9; R Vol. I, p.000109-000123. Because of the
continuing struggle and movement by Mr. Picatti, contact was lost between the Taser and

Mr. Picatti's body, causing the Taser prongs to automatically deploy. R Vol. I, p.000214, P. 81,
L. 2-25. After Mr. Picatti was tased, he was handcuffed. R Vol. I, p.000215, P. 84, L. 12-14.
Mr. Picatti was transported to the Ada County Jail where he was booked for felony
Aggravated Battery on a law enforcement officer and misdemeanor Resisting and Obstructing
Officers. R Vol. I, p. 000523.
On August 20, 2014._Mr. Picatti appeared for a preliminary hearing, represented by attorney
Mark Manweiler. R Vol. I, p.000358-000383. Deputy Miner testified on direct examination and
was cross-examined by Mr. Manweiler. Id. Mr. Picatti also testified. Id. No other witnesses were
called. Id. Based on the testimony and evidence presented at the contested preliminary hearing, the
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Court found that probable cause existed, and Mr. Picatti was bound over to district court. R Vol. I,
p.00098-00099. The court entered a Commitment in pertinent part as follows:
COUNTI
That the Defendant, STEVEN LEROY PICATTI, on or about the 12th day of July,
2014, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did willfully and unlawfully use force
and/or violence upon the person of Ada County Sheri:frs Deputy Miner with a
deadly weapon, to-wit: by driving his Dodge pickup toward Deputy Miner striking
him, where the Defendant knew or had reason to know that Deputy Miner was a
sheriffs deputy and did commit said battery while Deputy Miner was engaged in the
performance of his duties. Id.
Prior to trial, a Rule 11 Plea Agreement was reached in which Mr. Picatti agreed to plead
guilty to Disturbing the Peace pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-6409.

R Vol. I, p.000102.

An

Amended Complaint was filed which provides that Mr. Picatti did '<willfully and maliciously disturb
the peace of a neighborhood, to wit: the intersection of Eagle Road and State Highway 44, by
tumultuous conduct, to wit: by failing to obey a traffic sign and driving into a restricted pedestrian
area." R Vol. I, p.000103-000104. A Judgment of Conviction was entered in which Mr. Picatti
waived his right to all defenses. R Vol. I, p.000105. The conviction has not been appealed,
overturned, or expunged. R Vol. I, p.000321, P. 139, L. 12-16.

II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Mr. Picatti's claims for false arrest are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487,
114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994), as success on his claims would imply the invalidity of his conviction
for Disturbing the Peace.
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Deputy Miner and Deputy Laurance are entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule 41 and 42 U.S.C. 1988 as Mr. Picatti appealed this case frivolously, unreasonably,
and without foundation.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court utilizes the same standard as
the district court. Farmers Nat'!. Bankv. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853,855,318 P.3d
622, 624 (2014). Summary Judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See I.R.C.P. 56. "If there is no
genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises
free review." Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., 147 Idaho 737, 746, 215 P.3d
457,466 (2009) (citations omitted).
For purposes of qualified immunity, the non-moving party's version of the material facts
is adopted and all reasonable inferences are drawn in their favor. Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d
433,439 (9th Cir. 2011). There are limits to this deference, however. The nonmoving party must
set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial; the "mere scintilla of evidence in
support of plaintiff's position [is] insufficient." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
252, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).
A correct statement of the law is that when a defendant makes a properly supported
motion for summary judgment based on official immunity, the plaintiff must produce evidence
of his own. Butler v. San Diego Dist. Atty's Office, 370 F.3d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 2004). A
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plaintiff may not rest upon the allegations contained in his complaint, but rather must provide

evidence for the court's consideration. Id. at 963. Likewise, if a plaintiff's version of the events
"is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should
not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment."

Scottv. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,380,127 S. Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007).

IV. ARGUMENT
A. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN APPLYING COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
TO BAR MR. PICATTI FROM RELITIGATING PROBABLE CAUSE AS IT WAS
LITIGATED AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
1. In Idaho, collateral estoppel applies to bar the relitigation of probable cause in a
civil case when probable cause was found in a prior criminal preliminary hearing.
When a court decides an issue of law or fact essential to its judgment, that decision may
preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit based on a different cause of action if the new suit
involves a party to the first case. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S. Ct. 411, 414 (1980).
This is the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Id. Collateral estoppel applies to 42 U.S.C. §1983
civil rights claims. Id.

In the present case, Mr. Picatti has argued that no Idaho court has decided the narrow,
specific issue of whether a finding of probable cause at the preliminary hearing in the criminal
matter collaterally estops relitigating probable cause in the related § 1983 civil matter. Although
the specific issue has not been decided by an Idaho court, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that
collateral estoppel applies to 42 U .S.C. § 1983 civil rights cases. Additionally, it is settled that
state law governs the application of collateral estoppel to a state court judgment in a federal civil
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rights action. Hall v. Tudbury, 35 Fed. Appx. 428, *432, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 7409, *1 l (9th
Cir. 2002) citing Ayers v. City ofRichmond, 895 F.2d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1990).
Idaho Courts have adopted a five-part test to determine if collateral estoppel should apply
and there is no reason that it would not apply in this specific context. The lack of an Idaho case
does not dictate whether collateral estoppel applies to bar the relitigation of probable cause in a

§ 1983 civil case when it was decided in the underlying criminal case. Instead, it is simply a
question of whether the elements of collateral estoppel have been met.

Mr. Picatti, however, has argued that the Idaho Supreme Court has accepted the principal
that where there are conflicting facts, the existence of probable cause is a jury question. Mr.
Picatti relies on Sprague v. City of Burley, 109 Idaho 656, 663, 710 P.2d 566, 573 (1985) and

Patzig v. O'Neil, 577 F.2d 841, 848 (3rd Cir. 1978) for this argument. However, these cases are
irrelevant as they are not factually analogous. The applicability of collateral estoppel was not
addressed in those cases. Neither of those cases involved a felony arrest, a preliminary hearing,
or a prior determination of probable cause.
Rather, the district courts in those cases were asked to make a determination regarding
probable cause for a misdemeanor arrest in the first instance on summary judgment in Sprague
and directed verdict in Patzig. Those cases are simply irrelevant and of no assistance in deciding
the issues in the present case.
Contrary to Mr. Picatti 's argument, the issue of probable cause in a § 1983 civil rights
case is not a jury question when there has been a prior determination at a preliminary hearing.
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Instead, the court must evaluate whether the elements of collateral estoppel have been met and, if
so, a plaintiff in a §1983 case will be barred from relitigating probable cause.

2. Mr. Picatti is barred from relitigating probable cause because all of the elements of
collateral estoppeJ have been satisfied in this case.
Generally, the requirements of collateral estoppel are met when a court is "asked to give
preclusive effect to preliminary hearing probable cause findings in subsequent civil actions for
false arrest." Wige , 713 F.3d at 1184 (citing McCutchen v. City of Montclair, 73 Cal.App. 4th
1138, 1144-1147, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 95, 99-101 (1999)) 1•

In Idaho, collateral estoppel bars

relitigation of an issue of law or fact previously determined when the following factors are met:
(I) The party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was
identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was
actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior
litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a
1

The McCutchen holding was called into question by Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto, 157
Cal.App. 4th 728, 767-768 (2007), as modified (Jan. 2, 2008). The Schmidlin Court stated that
"[t]he issue of 'probable cause' to arrest ... is simply not the same as-let alone identical to-that of sufficient cause to hold the defendant for trial." Because of Schmidlin, the Ninth Circuit
thought that it had been presented with a question without c;ontrolling precedent in California and
requested certification to the California Supreme Court in Patterson v. City of Yuba City, 884
F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2018). The California Supreme Court denied the request and cited to
McCutchen v. City ofMontclair, 73 Cal.App. 4th 1138 (1999) and Greene v. Bank ofAmerica,
236 Cal.App. 4th 922
(2015). See http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.,gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=O&dockid=2245
915&doc no=S24746l&request token=NilwLSik.Xkw5WzBdSCJNWE1IIEA0UDxTJvMuVzx
TICAgCg%3D%3D. Both McCutchen and Greene support applying collateral estoppel to bar
the relitigation of probable cause when it was decided at a preliminary hearing because the issue
is identical.
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party to the litigation. Pocatello Hosp., LLC, v. Quail Ridge Med Investor, LLC, 157 Idaho 732,
738,339 P.3d 1136, 1142 (2014).
The factors that must be met in Idaho for collateral estoppel to apply are similar to the
factors that must be met in California. In California, collateral estoppel applies when (I) the
issue sought to be relitigated is identical to the issue decided in earlier action; (2) the issue was
actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided in the earlier action; (4) the earlier
decision is final and made on the merits; and (5) the party against whom issue preclusion is
asserted was a party to the earlier action or in privity with such party. Wige, 713 F.3d atl 184.
Mr. Picatti has argued that three of the five elements have not been met in this case. He
argues that the issues are not identical, that the issue sought to be precluded was not actually
decided, and that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior case.
Mr. Picatti is incorrect and each of the three elements will be addressed below.

3. The issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the
present action.
The issue to be decided in a §1983 claim for false arrest is whether there was probable
cause for the arrest at the time of the arrest. It is undisputed that a lack of probable cause is an
essential element of plaintiff's claim for relief based on false arrest. Forest v. City of Fort

Bragg, 2011 WL 13143893, *7 (N.D. Cal. 2011). The existence of probable cause is dispositive
as to a §1983 false arrest claim. Id.
Relatedly, the very purpose of a preliminary hearing in the criminal matter is to
determine whether probable cause for the arrest exists. See Idaho Criminal Rule 5.1. In the
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criminal case, a finding that the evidence was sufficient to require the defendant to stand trial for
the crimes charged is a finding of probable cause to arrest the defendant so long as the evidence
known to the arresting officers is not materially different from the evidence presented at the
preliminary hearing. Wige at 1184-1186; see also Haupt v. Dillard,

17 F.3d 285, 288-290 (9th

Cir. 1994). Thus, in most cases, the identity of issue requirement is satisfied because the issue at
the preliminary hearing is identical to the issue raised by a false arrest claim -- i.e. whether the
evidence supports a finding of probable cause for the arrest. Wige, 713 F.3d at 1185.
An exception to this general rule exists if the plaintiff establishes that the officer lied or

fabricated evidence and that issue was not raised at the preliminary hearing. Id. at 1186. In

Wige, the arresting officer and the shooting victim gave conflicting testimony at the preliminary
hearing regarding the victim's identification of the shooter. Id. Nonetheless, the court bound the
plaintiff over explaining: "There are issues in the case. I think most of the issues you addressed
are really for the jury to decide; not the Court at the preliminary hearing." Id. at 1184-1185.

In the related civil suit for false arrest, the court granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment as the claim was barred by collateral estoppel. Id. at 1185. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit reversed, finding that the identity-of-issue requirement was not met as the state court did
not decide whether the officer was telling the truth at the preliminary hearing. Id. at 1186.
However, the analysis does not stop there.

There is an exception to the exception.

Greene v. Bank ofAmerica, 236 Cal.App.41h 922, 931-933 (2015). If the plaintiff alleges that the
arresting officer lied or fabricated evidence at the preliminary hearing, and plaintiff challenges
that evidence at the preliminary hearing as being false, and the magistrate decides the credibility
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issue in the arresting officer's favor, then collateral estoppel still may preclude relitigation of the
issue in a subsequent civil proceeding involving probable cause. Id.

In Greene, the plaintiff filed a claim against defendants for malicious prosecution. Like a
claim for false arrest, an essential element of a claim for malicious prosecution, is the lack of
probable cause. Id. at 931. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment
finding that the claim was barred by collateral estoppel as the issue of probable cause had been
determined at a preliminary hearing. Id.
On appeal, plaintiff contended that collateral estoppel was not applicable because the
magistrate's probable cause determination was procured through fraud, lies, and fabricated
evidence. Id. While recognizing the exception set out in Wige, the California Supreme Court
held that the exception did not apply because the veracity of the defendant was challenged at the
plaintiff's preliminary hearing and the magistrate made an explicit finding that 'probable cause'
existed, precluding the relitigation of that issue in this case. Id.
Similarly in Guenther v. Holmgreen, 738 F.2d 879, 884-885 (7th Cir. 1984), the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the plaintiff was collaterally estopped from
relitigating probable cause because it was decided against him at the preliminary hearing. The
Seventh Circuit explained that where challenges are made at the preliminary hearing to the
veracity and integrity of the arresting officer's version of events, the finding of probable cause
necessarily requires an evaluation of the truthfulness as well as the sufficiency of the allegations
in support of probable cause.

When the Fourth Amendment demands a factual showing

sufficient to comprise 'probable cause,' the obvious assumption is that there will be a truthful
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showing. Id. citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164-165, 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2680-2681,
57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1977). A finding of probable cause necessarily depends on the magistrate
court's detennination that the arresting officer testified truthfully. Id.
Turning to the present case, the District Court correctly held that Mr. Picatti was barred
from relitigating probable cause, as it had already been determined at the preliminary hearing.
The identity of issue element was met because the issue decided at the preliminary hearing was
that there was probable cause for Mr. Picatti's arrest at the time of his arrest. That is the same
issue to be decided in the present civil suit-the lack of probable cause for his arrest is an essential
element of his claim and is dispositive of the claim. Thus, the general rule has been met.

In Idaho, the courts have not adopted or articulated any specific exceptions to the
application of collateral estoppel.

If the Court chooses to follow the California courts and

evaluate whether an exception might apply, the result in this case will be the same, as the
magistrate judge made a specific determination of probable cause at the preliminary hearing after
the credibility and veracity of Deputy Miner was challenged by Mr. Picatti. Thus, the exception
to the exception will apply in this case to prevent Mr. Picatti from relitigating probable cause.
Specifically, this case is more analogous to Greene and Guenther than to Wige. At the
preliminary hearing in Wige, the judge simply determined that there were "issues to be decided
by the jury." At the preliminary hearing in this case, the Judge stated,

Well, um, you know I understand where you're both coming from, I, however, do
believe that the State has met its burden when you piece together 18-915 which is
the assault and battery upon certain personnel along with 903 which defines
battery and battery includes under subsection (b) actual intentional and unlawful
touching or striking of another person against the will of another. ,Sol think there
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was a touching or striking~ Um because it was a vehicle involved that makes it
aggravated and then um bfficer Miner was wearing his high visibility uniform.
For what it's worth I do realize this happened pretty quickly but I have no reason
to believe that Mr. Picatti was not aware that he was a law enforcement officer so
the bare bones of this is here so I'm binding it over....
The magistrate found that there was probable cause

as he found that Mr. Picatti touched

or struck Deputy Miner with his vehicle and he was aware that Deputy Miner was a law
enforcement officer. This determination was tnade after Mr. Picatti's attorney cross-examined
Deputy Miner during which he called his veracity and credibility into question. Additionally,

Mr. Picatti testified on his own behalf that there was no damage to the front of his vehicle,
calling into question Deputy Miner's version of events. Mr. Picatti's attorney asserted in his
closing argument that Deputy Miner's testimony was contradicted by the physical evidence, that
it was in conflict with his own police report, and that it was nothing short of miraculous that
none of the officers had an audio recording of what happened.
He argued that Mr. Picatti's vehicle was in park at the time he was taken out of it so that
contradicted the version given by Deputy Miner that the truck kept moving forward.
Mr. Picatti's attorney was given the opportunity for sur-rebuttal in closing; he argued that it was
miraculous and amazing that the State did not produce a single civilian witness to corroborate
Deputy Miner's version of the events and that his testimony was not consistent with being struck
twice. He argued that there was no substantial credible evidence.
The magistrate did not make a vague decision as in Wige that either side could be
believed and that it was up to the jury to decide who to believe. Rather, the magistrate made a
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specific articulated finding of probable cause based on the evidence Deputy Miner had available
to him at the time he arrested Mr. Picatti.

In determining that Mr. Picatti struck or touched Deputy Miner with his vehicle, the
magistrate made a credibility determination.

By binding Mr. Picatti over, the magistrate's

finding necessarily entailed a rejection of the challenges raised to the veracity of Deputy Miner.
Deputy Miner's credibility and veracity was raised and litigated at the preliminary hearing. The
finding of probable cause necessarily required an evaluation of the truthfulness as well as the
sufficiency of Deputy Miner's allegations in support of probable cause. As in Guenther, the
magistrate's finding of probable cause to arrest Mr. Picatti, having been made only after
Mr. Picatti fully challenged Deputy Miner's veracity, necessarily depended on the magistrate's
determination that Deputy Miner truly stated the factual basis for probable cause.
The identity of issue element has been met as the precise issue of whether there was
probable cause for the arrest was decided at the preliminary hearing. Additionally, Mr. Picatti
failed to establish that Deputy Miner lied and that Deputy Miner's credibility was not raised and
addressed at the preliminary hearing; a task he cannot do. The probable cause finding was made
only after Mr. Picatti's attorney raised the issue of Deputy Miner's credibility and the magistrate
necessarily made a determination. Thus, the identity of issue element has been met.

4. The issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation.
It is well established that if one party has carried the burden of proving an issue in the
first proceeding, a favorable determination on that issue is binding in later litigation in which the
burden of proving the contrary would be on the adversary. See Guenther, 738 F.2d at 888 (citing
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18C.Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper Federal Practice and Procedure§ 4422 at 213 n. 7); One
Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. US, 409 U.S. 232, 235, 93 S.Ct. 489,492, 34 L.ed.2d 438 (1972). In
Guenther, plaintiff suggested that collateral estoppel should not apply because the state's burden

of evidentiary proof in the criminal proceeding was less than the burden it must shoulder with
respect to a §1983 cause of action. Id.
The Seventh Circuit did not agree. It explained that while it is true that the failure to
carry a higher standard of proof does not preclude a subsequent attempt to satisfy a lower
standard, the opposite is not true. Id. For example, a government's failure to prove an issue
beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal prosecution does not preclude a subsequent attempt to
prove the same issue by a preponderance of the evidence in a civil action. Id.
In the criminal proceeding in that case, the state assumed the initial burden of producing
evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable probability that plaintiff had committed a crime. Id.
By finding probable cause, the court determined that the state had met its burden. Id. In the
§1983 action, plaintiff had the burden of proving all the elements of his §1983 claim, including

the absence of probable cause, by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Thus, he assumed a
greater burden of proof than he had in the state criminal proceeding and could not avoid the
preclusive effect of the state court's determination on grounds of different or shifting standards
of evidentiary proof. Id.

In the present case, the issue sought to be precluded-whether Deputy Miner had
probable cause to arrest Mr. Picatti at the time of the arrest-was actually decided in the prior
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litigation. Whether there was probable cause was the one issue to be decided at the preliminary
hearing; that is the very purpose of the preliminary hearing.

Mr. Picatti is attempting to make the same argument that the Seventh Circuit rejected in
Guenther. Since the burden of proof in the criminal preliminary hearing is lower than that which

Mr. Picatti bears in the civil matter, he cannot avoid the preclusive effect of the magistrate's
determination on grounds of different or shifting standards of evidentiary proof. He is precluded
from attempting to prove the absence of probable cause at a higher standard or proof.
Additionally, although not clear, it appears that Mr. Picatti argues that preclusive effect
should not be given because the standard for probable cause in a criminal proceeding is different
from the standard for probable cause in the §1983 action. Mr. Picatti's analysis is incorrect. The
probable cause standard in both the criminal proceeding and the § 1983 case is the same whether the facts and circumstances were sufficient to warrant a reasonable person in believing
that the suspect had committed a crime. The probable cause standard does not change regardless
of whether it is being evaluated at the preliminary hearing or in the §1983 action. It will always
be the lesser standard of 'reasonable probability.'
This means that in the §1983 action, Mr. Picatti would have to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that a reasonable person would not have believed that Mr. Picatti committed the
crime. This he cannot do, because it has already been determined that a reasonable person would
believe that he committed the crime. Mr. Picatti's argument is illogical. He does not get a
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second bite at the apple to disprove probable cause at a higher standard of proof when it has
already been proven at a lower standard2 •
The issue sought to be precluded-whether there was probable cause for the arrest-was
decided at the preliminary hearing and the differing standards of proof does not change that fact.

5. Mr. Picatti had a full and fair opportunity to litigate probable cause.
To satisfy the "full and fair opportunity to litigate" requirement, the prior state
proceedings "need do no more than satisfy the minimwn procedural requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause." Kremer v. Chemical Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481,
102 S.Ct. 2375 (1982). A Fourth Amendment judicial determination of probable cause need not
be accompanied by the full panoply of adversarial-type safeguards-e.g., counsel, confrontation,
and cross-examination of witnesses. Erstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119-121, 95 S.Ct. 854, 865-

866, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975).
Typically, a preliminary hearing is an adversarial proceeding, designed to litigate
probable cause, in which the accused may cross-examine witnesses pertinent to the issue of
probable cause to arrest, such as the arresting officer and the complaining witness, and present
2

Mr. Picatti's disagreement with the magistrate's determination should have been raised in his
criminal proceeding as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-815A. This provides the
avenue for a criminal defendant that wants a second bite at the apple to challenge the finding of
probable cause. A subsequent civil action seeking money damages is not the appropriate avenue.
LC.§ 19-815A provides: "A defendant once held to answer to a criminal charge under this
chapter may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence educed at the preliminary examination by
a motion to dismiss the commitment, signed by the magistrate .... Such motion to dismiss shall
be heard by a district judge.
If the district judge finds that the magistrate has held the defendant to answer without reasonable
or probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed the crime for which he was held to
answer, ... , he shall dismiss the complaint, ... and order the defendant discharged."
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evidence negating the existence of probable cause. Mccutchen 73 Cal.App.4th at 1146. Such
hearing gives the accused ample opportunity to litigate probable cause. Id. at 1147.

A failure to take advantage of the opportunity to litigate probable cause wi11 not preclude
collateral estoppel. Hoffman v. Gibson, 2017 WL 3457525, *2-*3, Case No.: 3:17-cv-00618-HBLM (S.D. Cal. 2017). In Hoffman, a preliminary hearing was held in which plaintiff appeared
and was represented by counsel. Id. at *2. The court heard testimony from the defendant officer
and the plaintiff. Plaintiff had the opportunity to cross-examine the defendant.

Id. At the

conclusion of the evidence, counsel for both sides had the opportunity to argue their case. Id.
In the civil case, the plaintiff argued that he did not have a full and fair opportunity
because the state did not call one of the witnesses. Id. at *3. The court concluded that the
plaintiff had the opportunity to call the witness but offered no explanation for why he did not.

Id. The court held that these proceedings offered plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to litigate
probable cause and he took advantage of it. Id. Any failure on his part to take advantage of the
opportunity to litigate by failing to call a witness would not preclude collateral estoppel. Id.

In the present case, Mr. Picatti had a full and fair opportunity to litigate probable cause at
the preliminary hearing. As stated above, the U.S. Supreme Court has found that only minimal
procedural due process requirements must be met. In this case, Mr. Picatti was given a more
extensive and probing hearing.

His counsel extensively cross-examined Deputy Miner and

presented Mr. Picatti's own testimony in rebuttal in an attempt to impeach the evidence
supporting probable cause. At the close of the evidence, Mr. Picatti's counsel was given two
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opportunities to argue the evidence which he took and attempted to convince the court that there
was no probable cause for the arrest.

Mr. Picatti has argued that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate probable
cause because he did not have the contact infonnation for witness Mr. Maldonado or the reports
of Meridian Officer Goodspeed or Severson 3. Mr. Picatti's argument is without merit.
Mr. Picatti admits that he was aware of Mr. Maldonado and Officer Goodspeed at least
three weeks prior to the preliminary hearing. Mr. Picatti had the opportunity to contact them and
call them as witnesses at the preliminary hearing. Similar to the plaintiff in Hoffman, he simply
chose not to and he cannot now complain of his failure to do so. Mr. Picatti cannot sit on his
hands and now argue that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate probable cause.
As in Hoffman, Mr. Picatti's failure to take advantage of the opportunity to litigate probable
cause, by calling the witnesses himself, will not preclude collateral estoppel.
Mr. Picatti also has argued that he did not fully litigate probable cause for tactical
reasons. In some situations, the criminal defendant may have tactical reasons not to litigate the
probable cause issue. Haupt v. Dillard, 17 F.3d at 289. However, unless the plaintiff in the civil
3

In State v. Ricks, 122 Idaho 856, 861-862, 840 P.2d 400 (Ct. App. Idaho 1992), in determining
whether to allow the use of the transcript of the preliminary hearing at trial as the arresting
officer had died prior to trial, the court held that the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate probable cause at the preliminary hearing. The court explained that, in practice, the
discovery to which the defendant is ultimately entitled will frequently be incomplete or even
nonexistent at the time of the preliminary hearing. Nevertheless, determination of the adequacy
of opportunity to conduct meaningful cross-examination focuses primarily not on the practical
realities facing counsel at the preliminary hearing but rather upon the scope and nature of the
opportunity for cross examination permitted by the court. Accordingly, a decision by counsel
not to cross-examine at any prior hearing or to do so only to a limited extent, no matter how
much practical sense the decision makes, does not appear to affect adequacy of opportunity.
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suit can demonstrate that the issue of ;probable cause was not litigated at the preliminary hearing,
the court will presume that the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of
probable cause to arrest. Id. at 289-290.
In Haupt, the plaintiff brought a § 1983 claim alleging lack of probable cause for his arrest.
Id. at 288. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on the grounds that

probable cause to arrest Haupt had been conclusively determined during his state criminal
prosecution and he was collaterally estopped. Id. Haupt appealed on several grounds, including
that tactical considerations prevented him from vigorously pursuing the issue of probable cause. Id.
To support his contention, he adverted to his attorney's deposition testimony that he
primarily uses the preliminary hearing as a discovery device. Id. at 290. Despite this, the Ninth
Circuit found that it did not negate the fact that Haupt's attorney vigorously fought the probable
cause issue and it was insufficient to prevent collateral. estoppel from applying. Id.
Similarly, in Moreno v. Baca, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3902, *21-*29, 2002 WL 338366 (D.
Cal. 2002), the court noted that the California Court of Appeals had explicitly adopted three
exceptions to the application of collateral. estoppel, one of which was where tactical. considerations
prevented a prior criminal defendant from vigorously pursuing the issue of probable cause during
the prior preliminary hearing. Id. at *21.

In that case, the court found that collateral estoppel did not bar the plaintiff's claims because
he presented sufficient evidence that his counsel did not vigorously pursue the issue of probable
cause during the preliminary hearing for tactical. considerations. Id. at *22-23. The court found it
significant that the transcript from the preliminary hearing included his counsel's unequivocal
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response that he was not making a motion on probable cause grounds. Id. at *28. The court makes
note of this at least three times in its opinion. Id. at *28-29. Plaintiff's counsel stated at the
preliminary hearing that he was 'just trying to establish the set of facts for observation purposes."

Id. at 28. The court also found it significant that plaintiff's counsel did not present any evidence
negating the existence of probable cause. Id.
The present case is distinguishable from Moreno. Mr. Picatti's counsel cross-examined
Deputy Miner and pointed out the potential deficiencies to a finding of probable cause. While the
State's direct examination of Deputy Miner consisted of approximately 12 pages of the transcript,
Mr. Manweiler's cross examination of him consisted of approximately 60 pages. He called out the
truthfulness of Deputy Miner's statements and set forth alternative theories to explain Mr. Picatti's
actions. Not only did he cross-examine Deputy Miner, he called Mr. Picatti and elicited testimony
from him to dispute that he hit Deputy Miner.
Further, unlike Moreno there is no statement on the record that he was not opposing a
finding of probable cause and only trying to establish the set of facts for observation purposes. The
opposite is true. Mr. Picatti's counsel vigorously argued that the State had not met its burden to
establish probable cause. In his closing argument, he set forth several reasons as to why the State
had not met its burden of proof.
Even assuming Mr. Manweiler did not litigate probable cause as vigorously as he could
have, he failed to steer clear of credibility issues at the preliminary hearing. Mr. Manweiler asked
questions whose only apparent tendency was to cast doubt or lay the groundwork for casting doubt
on Deputy Miner's claims that Mr. Picatti struck him with his truck.
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Mr. Picatti is seeking to have it both ways by using the issue of credibility as a pretext for
what he now characterizes as a discovery tactic, and in the civil case seeks to relitigate the issue
more. He cannot have it both ways. He cannot attack the credibility of Deputy Miner at the
preliminary hearing but say he was only doing it for discovery purposes. The District Court was
correct when it stated that the supposed distinction between contesting probable cause, on one hand,
and examining witnesses in a way that alerts the prosecutor to weaknesses in his case, on the other
hand, is an elusive one. R Vol. I, p. 000540.
In this case, Mr. Picatti had a full and fair opportunity to litigate probable cause and he took
advantage of it. He cannot complain now because he chose not to call Officer Goodspeed or

Mr. Maldanado. Furthennore, he has not overcome the presumption that he had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate probable cause as he has failed to prove that he did not fully and fairly
litigated probable cause due to tactical considerations.

As such, collateral estoppel applies and

Mr. Picatti cannot relitigate it in this subsequent civil suit.

6. Success on Plaintiff's Claims for Unlawful Arrest Would Imply the Invalidity of his
Conviction for Disturbing the Peace.
When a plaintiff seeks damages in a §1983 suit, the court must consider whether judgment
in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it
would the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or
sentence has already been invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S. Ct. 2364,
2372 (1994). A plaintiff does not avoid the Heck bar by pleading guilty to a lesser offense. Sealey

v. Fishkin, 1998 U.S. Lexis 20142, *12-13, 1998 WL 1021470 (D. N.Y. 1998); Cleveland v. King
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Cnty. Police, 19 Fed. Appx. 592 (9th Cir. 2001). By pleading guilty to any crime, a plaintiff
acknowledges that he was engaged in some unlawful activity for which the police could properly
take him into custody. Sealey 1998 U.S. Lexis 20142 at *13. Thus, as long as that conviction
stands, a plaintiff cannot pursue a §1983 false attest claim. Id.
In this case, Mr. Picatti alleges that the physical seizure of Mr. Picatti was intentional,
wrongful, and in the absence of probable cause. He makes this allegation despite the fact that he
pled guilty to the charge of Disturbing the Peace. By pleading guilty to Disturbing the Peace,

Mr. Picatti admits that his arrest was lawful. Additionally, a Judgment of Conviction was entered
which specifically provides that Mr. Picatti has waived bis right to all defenses. R Vol. I, p. 000105.
This would include any potential defense of lack of probable cause.

Mr. Picatti has not filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and has not taken any action to
challenge the validity of his conviction. The conviction has not been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, or declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination. If the court were to find that Mr. Picatti was unlawfully seized and entered judgment

in his favor on this §1983 action, it would invalidate Mr. Picatti's conviction for Disturbing the
Peace. Since the conviction has not been overturned, it bars Mr. Picatti's claim for false arrest.

B. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT MR. PICATTI DID
NOT HA VE A CLEARLY ESTABLISHED RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM THE FORCE
USED BECAUSE THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE COULD NO MORE BE
RELITIGATED IN THE EXCESSIVE FORCE CONTEXT THAN IT COULD BE IN
THE FALSE-ARREST CONTEXT.
1. Mr. Picatti cannot relitigate probable cause in the context of his excessive force claim.
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The facts supporting probable cause in the criminal matter cannot be relitigated in the civil
suit alleging excessive force. Anderson v. Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 179-182, 731 P.2d 171 (1987).

In Anderson, plaintiff was charged with felony aggravated assault on police officers. Id. at 179. At
trial, he was convicted of misdemeanor intentionally, without malice, aiming a firearm at others. Id.
He subsequently filed a §1983 claim alleging excessive force. Id. at 180. The defendants
argued that plaintiffs misdemeanor conviction operated to collaterally estop him from asserting to
the contrary in the civil action. Id. at 182. The court determined that the factual issue decided in the
criminal case was that plaintiff had pointed his shotgun at someone, at some point in time. Id. at

185. The court held that he would be estopped from denying those facts in the civil case. Id.

In the present case, the District Court made the same type of ruling as in Anderson. The
District Court did not hold that Mr. Picatti could not relitigate whether the Deputies used excessive
force. Rather, as in Anderson, the District Court held that Mr. Picatti ,could not relitigate the facts
that supported the finding of probable cause, i.e. Mr. Picatti cannot relitigate whether he
intentionally struck Deputy Miner with his vehicle.

He is estopped from denying that he

intentionally struck Deputy Miner with his vehicle4.
The cases cited by Mr. Picatti in his Opening Brief do not support his argument. Rather,
Dixon v. Richer, 922 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir. 1991), Gibson v. City of Oakland, 902 F.2d 39 (9th Cir.

1990), and Corbett v. Biggs, 2005 WL 991903 (N.D. ill. 2005) were cases in which the courts foWld
that the plaintiffs were not barred by collateral estoppel from bringing a civil excessive force claim
4

Contrary to Mr. Picatti's assertion, the Deputies asserted the affirmative defenses of collateral
estoppel, estoppel, and res judicata in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Defense in their Amended
Answer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. R, Vol. I, p. 000057.
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because the issue of whether the officers used excessive force was not decided in the prior case.
There was no argument or analysis, similar to the present case, regarding whether the plaintiffs were
barred from re-arguing the facts that had been decided in the prior case. Those cases simply stand
for the proposition that collateral estoppel would not, per se, bar the claim for excessive force.
With that background, the District Court correctly concluded that Mr. Picatti. did not have a
clearly established right to be free from the force used to arrest him. Mr. Picatti failed to come
forward with any case law that would have put the Deputies on notice that their actions were clearly
unlawful.

Without a case putting the issue clearly beyond debate, the right was not clearly

established and the Deputies were correctly granted qualified immunity.

2. If Mr. Picatti is not estopped from relitigating probable cause, the Deputies are still
entitled to qualified immunity because there was no constitutional violation.
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,231,
(2009). In determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the Supreme Court has
set forth a two-step analysis. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-201 (2001). The first inquiry is
whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right.

Id. If no constitutional right would have been violated, then the court should find that qualified
immunity is appropriate and there is no need to continue to the second inquiry. Id.
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i.)

The deputies did not use excessive force in pfl)lsically removing Mr. Picatti
from his vehicle and taking him to the ground

Excessive use of force claims are evaluated for objective reasonableness based upon the
information the officers had when the conduct occurred. Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 396,
(1989). The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.

Id.

Fourth

Amendment jurisprudence recognizes that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop carries
with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to affect it. Id.
Detennining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is reasonable requires a

careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. Ashbrook v. Boudinot, 2007
U.S. Dist. Lexis 88627, *2-*18 (S.D. Ohio 2007) citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The Court
should first consider the nature and quality of the alleged intrusion; then consider the governmental
interests at stake by looking at (1) how severe the crime at issue is, (2) whether the suspect posed an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and (3) whether the suspect was actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Id. In addition, the Court must consider the
totality of the circumstances. Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 826 (9th Cir. 2010).

In Ashbrook, the plaintiff was stopped on suspicion of driving under the influence. He
refused the officer's order to show his hands and get out of the car. Ashbrook, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis
88627 at *2. The officer grabbed him, pulled him to the ground, and tried to handcuff him. Id.
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The court found that the defendants did not use excessive force. Id. at *18. In doing so, the
court found that plaintiff refused to pull over and refused the officer's repeated requests to put his
hands in the air and to get out of the car. Id. The court noted that for a police officer, approaching
an uncooperative suspect in his vehicle is an uncertain, tense, and dangerous proposition. Id. The
officer had no idea whether plaintiff's apparent defiance would escalate into violence. Id. Nor
could the officer know whether plaintiff had a weapon. Id. Further, plaintiff had not exited the
vehicle nor had he surrendered the keys. Id. Had he tried to flee, his vehicle would have been a
danger to other motorists. Id. Under such circumstances, it is reasonable for an officer to pull an
uncooperative suspect from his vehicle. Id.
Likewise, in Yadon v. Hilton, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5553, 2013 WL 160445, *5-*16 (D.
Kansas 2013), aff'd, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 11738, 2013 WL 2489935 (10th Cir. 2013) the court
found that an officer that pulled the plaintiff out of his van and struggled to handcuff him did not use
excessive force. During the officers' investigation of car accident, the plaintiff was yelling and
flailing his arms in the vicinity of the officers. Id. at *5. One of the officers told him he was under
arrest for disorderly conduct and directed the plaintiff to put his hands behind his back. Id. at *6.
The plaintiff ignored the officer's request and instead hurried to his van. Id. The officer
pulled plaintiff away from the van and took him to the ground. Id. While two officers attempted to
hold plaintiff down so a third officer could handcuff him, plaintiff pulled his arms away several
times. Id. Plaintiff continued to struggle and complained that he could not breathe. Id.
The court applied the Graham factors and found the first factor only slightly justified the use
of force as plaintiff was being arrested for a misdemeanor. Id. at *11. The second factor modestly
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supported the use of force as there was no evidence that the plaintiff posed an immediate threat to
the safety of defendants or others except to the extent that he was angry and flailed his arms. Id
However, the third factor strongly supported the use of force because the plaintiff actively resisted
arrest. Id. The court concluded that where all three factors supported some use of force and the use
of force was not clearly egregious, the officers did not use excessive force. Id. at +16.
Applying the Graham factors to the present case, the Court should find that the deputies are
entitled to qualified immunity. First, as in Yadon, the encounter with Deputy Miner started as a
relatively minor traffic violation5 • However, the situation quickly escalated when Mr. Picatti hit
Deputy Miner and then refused to cooperate. Thus, the first factor weighs in favor of the use of
force even if the Court considers the crime to be the traffic violation and resisting and obstruction.
Under the second factor, as in Yadon and Ashbrook, Mr. Picatti's undisputed failure to obey
Deputy Miner's repeated commands to get out of his running vehicle in the heavy pedestrian area
posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers and pedestrians. Mr. Picatti could have easily
put the truck in "Drive" and proceeded through the pedestrians. As noted in Ashbrook, Deputy
Miner was faced with an uncertain, tense and dangerous proposition as he approached an
uncooperative suspect in his vehicle. Deputy Miner did not know whether Mr. Picatti's defiance
would escalate to violence nor did he know whether Mr. Picatti had a weapon. Due to his failure to
comply with Deputy Miner's repeated requests, Deputy Miner was forced to physically remove

5

Mr. Picatti incorrectly argues that there was no traffic stop in this case. The traffic stop for
which Deputy Miner could have ordered Mr. Picatti out of the truck, absent the aggravated
assault, was his driving around the traffic barrels, off the roadway, and into the area that was
blocked off to traffic.
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Mr. Picatti from his vehicle. As in Ashbrook, it is reasonable for an officer to pull an uncooperative
suspect from his vehicle. Thus, the second Graham factor weighed in favor of using force.
Third, Mr. Picatti actively resisted arrest as he was m1cooperative and struggled with Deputy
Miner and Deputy Laurance after he was pulled from his vehicle. Mr. Picatti admits that he did not
put his hands behind his back and further admits that he continued to press his hands to the ground
and was attempting to get up. R Vol. I, p. 000522. Mr. Picatti's actions must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene based upon the information the deputies had at the
time. In doing so, it was reasonable to conclude that Mr. Picatti was resisting or attempting to evade
arrest. Thus, the third Graham factor strongly supported the use of force.

Mr. Picatti's arguments do not provide sufficient reason for this Court to reverse the District
Court's grant of Summary Judgment to the Deputies. He attempts to argue the facts from his point
of view, after the fact. He attempts to invite the Court to view his version of the facts with the
benefit of 20/20 hindsight. This is inappropriate. It is abundantly clear that the only relevant
perspective is that of the officers on scene at the time-Deputy Miner and Deputy Laurance.
The reasonableness of the force they used does not get evaluated in the calm of the
courtroom with an 'after-the-fact' explanation from Mr. Picatti trying to justify his actions. Rather,

Mr. Picatti' s actions in driving around the traffic barrels at a higher than appropriate speed caught
the attention of Deputy Miner, Deputy Laurance and Officer Goodspeed to the point that they all
dropped what they were doing and started in Mr. Picatti's direction.

Mr. Picatti admits that he sat in his running vehicle after Deputy Miner ordered him to get
out. He further admits that after he was taken out of the vehicle and to the ground he tried to stand
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up. Although he says he was not resisting, Deputy Miner and Deputy Laurance did not have that
insight but rather relied on their training and experience to handle the arrest.
Additionally, Mr. Picatti argues that an alleged failure to tell him he was under arrest or that
a Taser was going to be used supports his argument that the force used was unreasonable. Mr.
Picatti makes reference to Idaho Code§ 19-608, but apparently fails to take the entire code provision
into consideration. It provides:
The person making the arrest must inform the person to be arrested of the intention
to arrest him, of the cause of the arrest, and the authority to make it, except when the
person to be arrested is actually engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to
commit, an offense, ....

Mr. Picatti was arrested for aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer and resisting
and obstructing. Clearly, he was still engaged in the commission of the offense. Regardless, there
is no case law holding that an officer's failure to immediately inform the suspect that he is being
arrested or that he is about to be tased weighs in favor of finding an unreasonable use of force.
Furthermore, Mr. Picatti argues that the force used was unreasonable because Deputy Miner
did not use a less intrusive alternative. That is not a true statement of the facts. Deputy Miner
ordered Mr. Picatti to get out of the vehicle but he did not comply. Mr. Picatti was given the
opportunity to comply with a less intrusive alternative, but he refused to take it. Deputy Miner did
not physically remove Mr. Picatti from the vehicle until after Mr. Picatti refused the order. Even
still, the law does not require the least intrusive use of force; it merely limits a use of force to that
which is reasonable under the circumstances.
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Mr. Picatti 's arguments fail to provide this Court with sufficient reason to overturn the
District Court's finding. As in Ashbrook and Yadon, this Court should find that the deputies'
actions were objectively reasonable and within the boW1ds of the Fourth Amendment.

ii.)

Deputy Miner did not use excessive force in tasing Mr. Picatti.

The leading authority on excessive force cases involving Tasers in the Ninth Circuit is

Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 437-452 (9th Cir. 2011). This is an en bane review of Brooks v.
City ofSeattle, 599 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2010) and Mattos v. Agarano, 590 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2010).
Brookf involved a plaintiff that was pulled over for speeding. Id. at 436. Due to her failure
to sign the citation, she was ordered to get out of the car. Id. at 437. After she refused, one of the
officers threatened to use the Taser. Id. At one point, the officer opened her door and twisted her
arm behind her back. Id. She stiffened her body and clutched the steering wheel to frustrate the
officer's attempts to remove her from the car. Id. Although the officers were aware that she was
seven months pregnant, they tased her three times within one minute. Id.
The Ninth Circuit applied the Graham factors and found that the traffic citation was not a
serious offense. Id. at 444. She did not pose an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
others as she did not verbally or physically threaten the officers and her keys were on the floor. Id.
The court found that she resisted arrest by refusing to get out of the car and clutching the steering
wheel. Id. at 445. However, her resistance did not involve any violent actions towards the officers
and she did not attempt to flee and there were no other exigent circumstances. Id.

In addition to the Graham factors the court found two specific factors overwhelmingly
salient. Id. First, Brooks told the officer that she was seven months pregnant. Id. The officers
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paused and discussed where they should tase her in light of her pregnancy. Id. Second, the officer
tased Brooks three times in less than a minute. Id. The court found that three tasings in such rapid
succession provided no time for Brooks to recover and reconsider her refusal to comply. Id.
The court concluded that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the officers' use of
force was unreasonable and therefore constitutionally excessive. Id. at 446. However, the officers
were entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established at the time of the
incident. Id. at 448.

In Mattos, the police were called to the plaintiff's home for a domestic dispute. Id. at 438.
After Officer Agarano questioned 1\1:r. Mattos, he asked plaintiff to go outside. Id. at 439. Before
she co~d comply, Officer Aikala entered the home and announced that Mr. Mattos was under
arrest. Id. As Aikala moved in to arrest Mr. Mattos, he pushed up against plaintiffs chest, at which
point she extended her arm to stop her breasts from being smashed. Id. Then, without warning,
Aikala tased the plaintiff. Id.

In applying the first Graham factor, the court found that the most that could be said about
plaintiff's actions was that, while standing between Mr. Mattos and Aikala, she attempted to prevent
Aikala from pressing up against her breasts. Id. at 449. While that may have momentarily deterred
Aikala's access to 1\1:r. Mattos, it did not rise to the level of obstruction. Id. Thus, the severity of the
crime was minimal. Id.
Second, there were no objective reasons to believe that she was anned, she was not verbally
threatening, and her only physical contact with Aikala resulted from her defensively raising her
hands to prevent him from pressing his body against hers. Id. Third, the most that could be said as
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to the third factor was that she minimally resisted Mr. Mattos' arrest. Id. She was trying to comply
with Agarano's request when she got caught in the middle of Mr. Mattos and Aikala. Id. at 450.
The court considered additional factors including the fact that domestic disputes can pose
safety risks to officers. Id. However, the alleged excessive force was against the potential nonthreatening victim whom the officers were called to protect. Id. The court found that a reasonable
fact finder could conclude that the use of the Taser was excessive. Id. at 451. However, the officers
were entitled to qualified immunity because they clid not violate clearly established law. Id. at 452.
The Idaho District Court has had the opportunity to apply the reasoning of Brooks/Mattos to
an alleged excessive force case involving a Taser. See Wise v. Kootenai County, 2013 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 60229, *3-*21, 2013 WL 1789716 (D. Idaho 2013). In that case, Deputy McAvoy attempted
to pull the plaintiff over for speeding. Id. at *3. The plaintiff continued driving until he reached his
residence and pulled into the driveway and exited his vehicle. Id.
The deputy repeatedly asked the plaintiff to remain seated in his car to which the plaintiff
refused. Id. While Deputy McAvoy waited for back-up, plaintiff indicated that he was going in his
house and walked toward the garage. Id. at *4. In response, Deputy McAvoy grabbed him and
attempted to place him under arrest. Id. The plaintiff protested and began to struggle. Id.
Deputy Duncan arrived and attempted to assist handcuffing the plaintiff. Id. While doing
so, the plaintiff broke free and ran into his garage. Id. at *5.
The court applied the Graham factors and found that the deputy initially attempted to stop
the plaintiff for a minor traffic infraction. Id. at *19. However, the situation quickly escalated when
the plaintiff refused the deputy's instructions to stay in his car, was hostile to the deputy, walked
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into his garage, and physically resisted when the deputy retrieved him from the garage. Id. at *20.
Therefore, the actual crime at issue was resisting and obstructing, which under the circumstances
weighed in favor of an intermediate use of force. Id.
Second, the court found that plainti:frs openly hostile attitude and ability to go into the
garage or house, both of which could contain a weapon, created a dangerous situation. Id. at *21.
Third, it was undisputed that plaintiff actively resisted the deputies' efforts and fled into the garage.
Id. The court concluded that it was reasonable and no a constitutional violation for Deputy Dunkin

to deploy his Taser to stop plaintiff from entering the house and bringing plaintiff under their
control. Id.
Finally, the Sixth Circuit has explained that cases addressing qualified immunity for Taser
use fall into two groups. See Cockerell v. City of Cinn., 468 Fed. Appx. 491, *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 23,
2012).

1be first involves plaintiffs that actively resisted arrest by physically struggling with,

threatening, or disobeying officers. Id. The second involved plaintiffs that had done nothing to
resist arrest or who were already detained. Id. The Sixth Circuit noted that defendants in the first
group were entitled to qualified immunity whereas defendants in the second group were not. Id.
The present case is distinguishable from Brooks and Mattos and is more analogous to Wise.
Unlike the plaintiffs in Brooks and Mattos, Mr: Picatti was an immediate threat to the officers and to
the public. Specifically, he drove his vehi~le around barriers that were meant to keep vehicles out
of the heavy pedestrian area Not only were the keys in the ignition but his vehicle was still
running. He refused to get out of his vehicle and had he attempted to flee, his vehicle would have
been a danger to numerous pedestrians.

Furthermore, unlike the plaintiffs in Brooks and Mattos, Mr. Picatti physically resisted
arrest. He admits that rather than obeying the deputies' commands, he refused to get out of his
vehicle and he attempted to get up off the ground. Although Mr. Picatti attempts to paint a picture
of innocently trying to get off the ground, it was clearly reasonable to interpret Mr. Picatti's actions
as physically resisting arrest.
Additionally, when considering the totality of the circumstances, there are no
overwhelmingly salient factors as in Brooks. He was tased only after he physically resisted arrest
and failed to comply with the deputies' orders.

The tasing occurred in response to and

simultaneously with his physical resistance. The deputies did not take a break to consider the best
way to tase him. Rather, it was in response to a quickly escalating situation in an area with
numerous bystanders. Further, he was not a victim that the deputies were called to assist and he did
more than minimally resist the arrest of another as in Mattos.
Toe facts of the present case are more like the facts in Wise. In Wise, the plaintiff refused to
stay in his car. In this case, Mr. Picatti refused to get out of his vehicle. In Wise, when the deputy
grabbed the plaintiff and attempted to place him under arrest he protested and struggled. In this
case, when Mr. Picatti was removed from his vehicle, he protested and struggled. In Wise, when the
deputies attempted to handcuff the plaintiff he struggled, eventually breaking loose and running to
the garage at which time he was tased. In this case, when Deputies Miner, Laurance and Officer
Goodspeed attempted to handcuff Mr. Picatti he struggled and was tased before he could break
loose. As in Wise, it was reasonable to use a Taser on Mr. Picatti due to his physical resistance.
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This conclusion is further supported by the Sixth Circuit's decision in Cockerell, wherein it
explained that cases involving plaintiffs that actively resisted arrest fell into the first group of cases
which held that officers were entitled to qualified immunity. This case fits squarely within the first
group of cases and the Deputies are entitled to qualified immunity.
Deputy Miner is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate Mr. Picatti's
constitutional rights. The use of the Taser on Mr. Picatti was not excessive and was a reasonable
way to bring Mr. Picatti under their control.
3. The right to be free from the force used was not clearly established.

If there was a constitutional violation, "the second inquiry is whether the officer could
nevertheless have reasonably but mistakenly believed that his or her conduct did not violate a
clearly established constitutional right." Id. If the law did not put the officer on notice that his
conduct would be clearly unlawful, dismissal based on qualified immunity is appropriate. Saucier
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-201 (2001). In determining whether the right was clearly established at

the time of the conduct, the court must ask whether its contours were "'sufficiently clear' that every
'reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.'" Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 713, 740, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011).

The clearly established law must be particularized to the facts of the case and not defined at
a high level of generality. White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (January 9, 2017) (citing Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). Liability cannot be imposed for an alleged constitutional

violation unless existing precedent has been identified that provides "clear notice" the conduct was
unconstitutional under the circumstances. S.B. v. County of San Diego, 864 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th
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Cir. 2017). The clearly established analysis "must be undertaken in light of the specific context of
the case, not as a broad general proposition," especially in Fourth Amendment claims, "where '[i]t
is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive
force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts." Id. (internal citations omitted).
Liability cannot be imposed on a law enforcement officer unless there was precedent at the time of
the incident holding that an officer acting in similar circumstances had violated the Fourth
Amendment. Id.
The court must allow "for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-secondjudgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the am01mt of
force that is necessary in a particular situation." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-397. Qualified immunity
protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. Rosenberger v.

Kootenai County Sheriff's Dept., 140 Idaho 853,471, 103 P.3d 466 (2004) (citing Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335,341 (1986)).
As of July 12, 2014, the date of the subject incident, there was no clearly established law to
put the Deputies on notice that their actions were illegal.

Mr. Picatti has the burden to come

forward with case law providing "clear notice" that the force used was unreasonable. He has failed
to do so and instead cited to LC. §§19-608 and 19-610. The Idaho criminal code sections regarding
use of force do not clearly define what is an unreasonable use of force in a § 1983 civil rights matter.
Mr. Picatti cannot meet his burden as there is no case law that clearly establishes that the use
of force was unreasonable. Rather, the case law establishes that it is reasonable for an officer to pull

an uncooperative suspect from his vehicle.
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Additionally, as stated above, the Brooks/Mattos en bane decision was issued on October
17, 2011. It established that it might have been excessive to tase a seven month pregnant woman
three times in less than one minute when she was not a threat and was not physically resisting arrest.
It further established that it might have been excessive to tase the female victim of a domestic
dispute that merely raised her arm to protect herself from being smashed by one of the officers
while she was attempting to comply with one of the other officer's requests. Finally, Wise, decided
on April 26, 2013, established that it was excessive to intentionally tase the plaintiff two to four
more times after he was incapacitated, no longer a threat, and no longer resisting arrest.
These cases do not clearly establish that it would have been excessive to tase Mr. Picatti
under the facts of this case. It cannot be said that every reasonable officer would have understood

that what he was doing violated a constitutional right. Because a reasonable officer could have
believed that the conduct comported with the Fourth Amendment, the Deputies cannot be held
liable. They are entitled to qualified immunity and the District Court's decision should be affirmed.

C. THE DEPUTIES ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR ATTORNEY FEES AS MR. PICAITI
BROUGHT TIDS APPEAL FRIVOLOUSLY, UNREASONABLY, AND WITHOUT
FOUNDATION.
Pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. §1988(b):
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983,
1985 and 1986 of this title ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs ....
This statute allows a court to award attorney fees to a prevailing defendant upon the
finding "that the plaintiffs action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even
though not brought in subjective bad faith." James v. City of Boise, 160 Idaho 466, 488 (2016)
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citing Hughes v. Rowe. 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980). In James, the plaintiff alleged a claim under
§1983, for excessive force, among other claims. The district court granted the defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court awarded the defendants'
attorney fees pursuant to §1988 as it was clear that plaintiffs claim would be barred by qualified
immunity under the clearly established law and the plaintiff did not cite to any law to the
contrary. Id.
In this case, the law is clear that Mr. Picatti's claims for unlawful arrest in the absence of
probable cause is barred by collateral estoppel and it is clear from case law that Mr. Picatti did
not have a clearly established right to be free from the force used under the specific
circumstances. It is frivolous for Mr. Picatti to allege a claim for unlawful arrest when the
magistrate already made that determination in the underlying criminal matter. The law is clear
that collateral estoppel applies to such a situation and it is frivolous for Mr. Picatti to continually
argue that he should not be bound by the magistrate's decision. There is no reasonable basis or
foundation for any of the arguments Mr. Picatti makes as to why he should not be bound by the
magistrate's determination of probable cause.
Mr. Picatti's claims for excessive force also are frivolous, unreasonable, and without
foundation.

Similar to the James case, Mr. Picatti's claim for excessive force is frivolous

because it is clear that his claim is barred by qualified immunity as there are no cases
establishing that Mr. Picatti had a clearly established right to be free from forcible removal from
his vehicle or from being Tased in these circumstances. Similar to James, Mr. Picatti did not cite
to a single case holding that the forcible removal of Mr. Picatti from his vehicle or the use of the
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Taser in similar circumstances was excessive. Rather, Mr. Picatti attempts to define the right too
broadly like the plaintiff did in James.

The right must be clearly established in a more

particularized and more relevant sense than simply saying that a person has the right to be free
from excessive force.
There was no reasonable basis or foundation for the arguments Mr. Picatti made as to
why Deputy Miner and Deputy Laurance are not entitled to qualified immunity.

As such,

Deputy Miner and Deputy Laurance are entitled to attorney fees for defending this appeal.

V. CONCLUSION
Deputy Miner and Deputy Laurance respectfully request that this Court affirm the District
Court's grant of Summary Judgment in their favor and award them their attorney fees.
DATED this 22nd day of June, 2018.

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

r-----.
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